A inaptidão normativa da atividade de inteligência de estado brasileira

Abstract

The vast majority of States carry out Intelligence Activities which, when performed by these subjects in a civilian manner, are titled State Intelligence Activities. Brazil does distance itself from this activity and, through Law 9.883/99, created the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), which are part of the coercive core of the State, on a certain threshold between the Armed Forces and the Diplomatic Ministry. Despite the fact that these institutions are absolutely vital to the achievement of Brazilian sovereignty both inside and outside the country and to providing the highest level of strategic advice to the authorities that benefit from their products, the regulatory landscape on this subject is scarce and, when it does exist, it is drawn up or sanctioned in a precarious, negligent and insufficient manner, both from the perspective of the Agency's own activities and when in comparison with similar international agenciesª activities, whether in constitutional or infra-constitutional terms. This paper therefore seeks to identify these problematic norms and propose solutions based on the view of the Realist School of International Relations. The method used consists of an analysis of documents and legislation, based on the collection of bibliographic and legislative data, as well as operating on the basis of propositions that are capable of solving the problem. In conclusion, it is proposed to draw up two draft regulations, a Draft Amendment to the Constitution and a Complementary Law, which summarize the solutions adopted.