Teoria dos jogos e incentivos fiscais: um exercício entre monopólio e governo

Abstract

This monograph models and analyzes the interaction between a monopoly firm and a government in the decisions of levels of tax benefit to be granted in counterpart to the private investment made by the firm. The Game Theory is used for the elaboration of several scenarios of interaction between firm and government. Different scenarios have been modeled in which the government instigates the generation of different levels of social welfare in the context of dispute over tax levels. Simultaneous games, sequential complete information and sequential incomplete information revealed that the balances to be effected by agents in each scenario depend on how efficient the firm is in further reducing the marginal cost of production. The result corroborates the assumption that the greatest gains for society are obtained when the firm is efficient. The best result for society reveals that the firm is encouraged to carry out a higher level investment in its structure, thus generating an optimal Pareto equilibrium, in which the optimal level of social welfare is at a higher level, as well as the monopoly firm's profit will be greater than if a lower level investment were to be realized. The work emphasizes the relevance of the levels of fiscal benefit and private investment to the promotion of an economy, in particular in the generation of social welfare and profitability of the target firm of the incentive, and to the correction of market failures, generating important conclusions that guide the actions of the public entity regarding the adoption of strategies for the granting of tax benefits in accordance with Brazilian legislation.