Uma defesa do realismo científico diante do empirismo construtivo

Abstract

Constructive empiricism is considered the main form of antirealism in the context of the debate about belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. According to this conception, formulated by Bas van Fraassen, the acceptance of a scientific theory does not involve belief in its truth. Furthermore, for this antirealist, there is no justification for belief in unobservable entities and processes, that is, those that cannot be perceived in any way by our senses without the aid of instruments, such as electrons and genes. In this context, the objective of this thesis is to analyze whether it is possible to defend a moderate version of scientific realism even in the face of constructive empiricism. Specifically, it aims to evaluate whether Bas van Fraassen's antirealist position withstands the criticisms directed at it by renowned philosophers of science, such as Stathis Psillos and Anjan Chakravartty. To this end, several collections containing objections to van Fraassen's antirealism are examined, such as those by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker (1985), Andreas Berg-Hildebrand and Christian Suhm (2006), and Bradley Monton (2007). Following this, a realist proposal is developed in response to constructive empiricism, which seeks to base itself primarily on the achievements of Biology, attempting to demonstrate that, despite the limitations of scientific knowledge, we are still justified in believing in the existence of some unobservable entities, or at least in the existence of entities similar to those that biologists consider to be investigating. Thereby, it is not viable to adopt an agnostic stance towards the entire unobservable domain of nature. To this end, arguments are articulated that seek to bring innovations by relating the discussion of realism to the scientific practice of biologists, citing as evidence for this belief: the effect of vaccination on the Covid-19 pandemic, the causal power of antibiotics, and the advances in genetic manipulation resulting from the development of molecular biology. Based on such scientific achievements, it is argued that realism is the best, or even the only, way to interpret and explain such successes in the practice of biological science.