Mercado de água e o estado: lições da teoria dos jogos

Abstract

The paper analyses the water allocation process among users by means of market mechanisms and shows the existing relationship between water price and the effectiveness of the command and control process via permit systems. It is the responsibility of the State responsibility to guarantee water rights, even though the expenditures associated with this process are acknowledged.. Even if the market system is used to decide the allocation process, the State will still bear the costs of enforcement. The presence and the action of the State are associated with the reduction of risk for the users. In order to analyze this relationship between the State and the Market, a mathematical model is proposed. The mathematical model is based on: i) the rational crime the- ory, in the context of the “Law & Economics School” for water stealing actions; ii) the intelligent market, simulated as an exchange center using linear programming; and iii) the games theory to model the interaction of different water users in a water system. The case study presented here shows that the market system will only be efficient if an efficient enforcement system is put in place by the State in order to inhibit the noncompliance of the water users.