O argumento do milagre sustenta o realismo científico?

Abstract

Scientific knowledge seeks to investigate both observable and unobservable phenomena of nature, that is, those that we cannot perceive directly from the senses. In this context, the debate about scientific realism deals with the relationship between our best scientific theories and the world. In this debate, what is under discussion is whether there is a reason to believe that the parts of our scientific theories that deal with unobservable phenomena and entities refer, even in an approximate way, to real phenomena and entities. On the one hand, realists defend the thesis that our best scientific theories are approximately true. On the other hand, antirealists either deny this thesis or are agnostic about the matter. In 1975, the philosopher Hilary Putnam proposed an argument in favor of scientific realism, considering that realism “(...) is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle.” (PUTNAM, 1975, p. 73). This argument became known as the Miracle Argument. The aim of this research is to evaluate whether this is a sufficient reason to support the realistic thesis. To do this, five objections that were directed to this argument are examined: the accusation of begging the question; the pessimistic meta-induction; the base rate fallacy; the alternative explanations for the success of science; and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Finally, we consider that Putnam’s defense does not seem to be able to sustain scientific realism, since, as noted by Fine (1986), the Miracle Argument seems to begs the question. Moreover, the existence of successful scientific theories that were later found to be false, highlighted by Laudan (1981) and Lyons (2002), removes Putnam’s assumption that a theory’s predictive success is a reliable indicator of its truth. Thus, we conclude that the Miracle Argument is not effective in defending the realistic thesis.