O ponto focal de Schelling como solução de interação estratégica resultante de múltiplos equilíbrios de Nash

Abstract

It is common, in situations of strategic interaction, observe multiple Nash equilibriums, some of them clearly unlikely of being observed. A way of selecting one Nash equilibrium among several existing and to make sure that only one arises from the rational behavior of the individuals is to use the concept of Schelling (1960)’s focal point, which states that factors such as cultural perceptions, historical traditions etc. may catch the attention of the players to a given equilibrium. In order to test this concept, we analyze the called Coin Game, which has an infinite number of Nash equilibriums. In this game, the players simultaneously determine how much they desire from a given amount of money, and they cannot, together, ask for an amount bigger than that available. We suppose that rational individuals choose their strategy maximizing their expected payoff, and we show that, from this fact, the players must choose as strategy half of the available amount to split up. For doing this, we apply the Coin Game in classes from the undergraduate courses of Economics and Business of UFC and we analyze the strategy distribution of the players using kernel density estimation. Besides the strategy of players, it is also asked about gender and knowledge in Game Theory, so we can identify possible factors affecting the strategy of the players. It was observed that most of the players, indeed, choose half of the available amount as strategy, however, male players and those who do have some knowledge in Game Theory are willing to choose this value more frequently.