Efeito moderador dos ambientes econômico e legal na relação entre a concentração de controle e o desempenho corporativo: evidências empíricas na América Latina

Abstract

In the light of the Agency Theory, the possibility of a negative relation between the concentration of control in the companies and their respective market values is conjectured by the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, typical of emerging economies, such as the countries of continental Europe and Latin America, due to the fact that these countries, among other aspects, present a low legal enforcement of protection to minority shareholders giving rise to opportunistic behavior by large controllers in the extraction of private control benefits. Although the literature dealing with these implications is extensive, including in less developed economies, the empirical results presented in these studies are divergent, making the discussions related to the issue inconclusive. In this way, I inquire about the possibility that the economic and legal environments in which the companies are located may interfere in this relationship, which has not been the specific object of investigation in these studies. In this context, the present research aims to examine the relationship between control concentration, corporate performance and the economic (market instability) and legal (legal aspects of minority protection) environments in Latin American companies. The study sample includes listed companies on the stock exchanges of six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru), taking as a period of analysis the years 2010 to 2016, making a total of 1,393 observations. Corporate performance, treated as a dependent variable, was represented by market value (Tobin's Q and Enterprise Value). The control concentration was treated as an independent variable, being approximated by the proportion of voting shares belonging to the three largest shareholders of the company. The economic instability of countries and their respective levels of legal protection to minority investors were also considered as independent variables, using different proxies suggested by the literature, such as inflation and the Legal Protection Index of Minority Investors of the countries, prepared by the World Bank. Different statistical procedures were used, such as descriptive statistics, correlation tests and multiple linear regression with parameters estimated by the Generalized Moment of Method (GMM). The results suggest a high concentration of control on the part of the Latin American companies, being identified higher levels of concentration of control in the companies of Argentina. From the analysis of correlation coefficients, it was observed that the market value shows a negative and significant correlation with the control concentration. The estimates of the econometric models in GMM confirmed a negative effect of the control concentration on the market value. After insertion of variables related to the economic environment, the negative correlation between control concentration and market value was confirmed in companies from countries with more unstable economies; however, this effect was not observed in countries with low economic instability, where the concentration of control loses significance in terms of influence on market value. Finally, a negative influence of the concentration of voting capital on market value was observed only in economies of low legal protection to the minority, evidencing a positive correlation between the constructs in countries of greater legal protection to the therefore accepting the hypotheses of the study. Thus, evidence of the destructive effects of large controlling shareholders on the market value (entrenchment effect) in Latin America is confirmed, but these effects may be enhanced or even attenuated by the characteristics of the economic and legal environment in which companies are inserted.