The proposition as a cross-section in the stream of experiences

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore, in a temporal perspective, Wittgenstein’s concept of proposition, developed at the end of 1929 and beginning of 1930. To comprehend this concept it is crucial to understand the way he articulates hypotheses and genuine propositions. Through this distinction Wittgenstein seeks to safeguard, in that period, the pictorial concept of proposition and, more importantly, the complete determination of sense. The way Wittgenstein articulates hypothesis and genuine proposition has some important temporal aspects. The temporal perspective will be central for the understanding of the requirement of the instantaneity of verification and to how Wittgenstein will regard the transtemporality of sense. The final part of this paper will be dedicated to some ideas present in section 102 of the BT (MS 111), where Wittgenstein locates a false analogy that, according to the temporal interpretation here proposed, would lead to the abandonment of the idea of genuine propositions.