Ensaios sobre microcrédito: trajetória de crescimento, renovação e inadimplência dos beneficiários

Abstract

In many countries, solidary microcredit programs for groups are working as an alternative mean to production, ensuring some space in the market to low-income people in the cities or in the countryside (in this study, through Crediamigo and Agroamigo programs, respectively). It was perceived that there’s an allocation of resources bias towards women in those programs because data shows that women are better payers and have a tendency not to take much risk when using borrowed money. Although those loans are an important chance of economic gain to very poor people, it was observed that many borrowers leave the programs after the first loan. These programs are taken as something that could end extreme poverty among small agriculturers, but the institutions who finance them have, then, to worry about default risk, since borrowers tend to leave the program without paying back. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze what determines microcredit programs, considering: a growth path for micro-entrepreneurs that is gender related; the possibility that social interaction (the groups mentioned) can affect the decision to keep paying and making new loans; the probability of default risk with random effects related to the microcredit analysts’ behavior. Results obtained in this study show there is a growth path, but with decreasing returns. Also, the average return rates are greater when men are managing; women, though, show less risky growth paths. When it comes to decide whether leave the program or not, the behavior of the rest of the group is important to the individual choice. Default risk is influenced by the credit analyst’s behavior and by how many clients he advises. Moreover, there are minor default risk factors associated with socioeconomic aspects of the borrower and the kind of business he manages, and even with those clients who participate in the Bolsa Família program. This last result is interesting, since it suggests that government transfers are being used as payment guarantees for the loans.