Ensaios sobre tempo de contratos

Abstract

The first proposes a theoretical model that analyzes the problem of designing optimal incentive contracts in continuous time. This thesis consists of two articles. The first proposes a theoretical model that analyzes the problem of designing optimal incentive contracts in continuous time, in order to determine the contract duration, in which a risk-neutral Principal contracts a risk-averse Agent subject. The contract is rigidly defined at the initial moment, including the linear incentive scheme and the contractual horizon. The optimal duration of the contract emerges from the interaction between the intertemporal discount factor and the agent’s participation constraint, with the reservation utility level being the central element of this mechanism, showing that contract continuity is largely determined by the participation conditions required by the Agent at the initial stage of contracting. The second article analyzes the factors associated with variation in contractual outcomes of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), with specific emphasis on contract duration as a central variable of analysis. The investigation focuses on how contractual duration influences the log odds of different outcomes, namely success (concluded) or failure (canceled or distressed). For this purpose, a multinomial logit model is used, suitable for handling categorical dependent variables with multiple categories. The results test the hypothesis that there exists an optimal contract duration, evidenced by the estimated inverted “U” shape, the estimates corroborate the hypothesis for the “U” shape, however, for the canceled status, no statistical significance was found. The hypothesis was also tested using marginal probabilities, and the estimates suggest that the “U” shape exists only for contracts that are technically active. The findings offer relevant contributions to the improvement of contractual design in infrastructure projects, assisting public managers and policymakers in defining more efficient contractual deadlines.