A neurociência da decisão judicial: os mecanismos cerebrais da (re)construção dos fatos

Abstract

The thesis entitled “The Neuroscience of Judicial Decision-Making: How the Brain (Re)Constructs Facts and How to Prevent Epistemic Injustices” investigates, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the neurocognitive foundations of judicial activity and their implications for the rational formation of conviction in legal proceedings. The research is based on the premise that fact-finding is, above all, an epistemological problem, constrained by the limits of perception, memory, and the cognitive biases that shape human reasoning.

Drawing on authors from multiple scientific fields, the thesis demonstrates that judicial knowledge is inevitably fallibilist, as it results from mental reconstruction processes influenced by prior schemas and automatic heuristics. From this premise, it proposes a model of epistemic judicial rationality that acknowledges the cognitive vulnerability of judges and seeks to mitigate it through techniques aimed at reducing biases and promoting fairer decisions.

The thesis integrates contemporary epistemology, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience with the theory of legal proof, exploring the tension between the normative ideal of rationality and the empirical limits of brain functioning. Among its practical contributions, it presents a Judicial Reasoning Protocol (JRP) and a Judicial Heuristics Review Protocol (JHRP), designed to assist judges in identifying biases, revising automatic reasoning, and constructing rational decisions.

Ultimately, the thesis argues that incorporating neuroscientific knowledge into judicial training and practice enhances the internal rationality of the law, enabling the recognition and correction of epistemic errors that, in the final analysis, undermine the justice of judicial decisions.