A túnica de Nesso: uma análise crítica do interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin em face do jusnaturalismo clássico

Abstract

This monograph critically analyzes Ronald Dworkin's interpretivism in contrast to classical natural law, particularly the Thomistic tradition, seeking to identify points of contact and divergence between these important legal theories. The study proposes a conciliatory synthesis while highlighting the inherent weaknesses of Dworkinian interpretivism that can be rectified by the contributions of classical natural law. Dworkin postulates a reintegration of morality into law, broadly defining natural law as any theory where the content of law depends on correct moral answers. He argues that judges resolve "hard cases" by seeking the best justification in principles of political morality, balancing "fit" and "justification" to present the law in its "best light," utilizing the "chain-novel" metaphor. For Dworkin, moral objectivity is interpretive and not founded on an external metaphysical reality, based on "Hume's Principle" which separates empirical facts from values. However, this approach implies that moral principles are in "constant flux," risking majoritarian relativism. In contrast, classical natural law, founded on a metaphysical perspective, asserts that moral principles are objective and rooted in human nature. Law is conceived as a hierarchical structure, from Eternal Law to Natural Law and Positive Law, with principles that, although human understanding of them evolves, are fixed and immutable in their essential content. This current offers "epikeia" (equity) as a virtue to set aside the literal application of the law when it proves unjust or contrary to the common good. The work concludes that, although both theories recognize an indissoluble link between law and morality, classical natural law provides more substantial and objective answers due to its metaphysical basis. The metaphor of the "Tunic of Nessus" is used to illustrate that Dworkin's purely human interpretive capacity is insufficient for the "Herculean" task imposed on judges. The study, then, proposes a transition "from Hercules to Samson," suggesting that true legal wisdom demands not only human effort but also adherence to transcendental principles and, ultimately, Divine Grace.