Gastos tributários e receitas tributárias municipais: evidências dos ciclos político-eleitorais

Abstract

This study aims at analysing whether electoral cycles and vertical political alignments shape municipal public finance by separating effects on tax expenditures (GT) and tax revenues (RT: ISS, IPTU, ITBI, fees, and COSIP). Using a balanced panel of Brazilian municipalities (2013–2021), two samples (all municipalities with RT; and those reporting GT in every year), and a Southern-region subsample, we estimate fixed- and random-effects models as indicated by Hausman tests, controlling for mayor characteristics and local socioeconomic conditions. Three findings stand out: (i) in municipal election years, taxes tied to transactions/registrations fall—especially ITBI (and, in some cuts, ISS)—while COSIP (a largely automatic levy linked to electricity consumption) rises; state/federal election years are associated with higher RT, IPTU, and fees; (ii) on political alignment, mayors aligned with the President show, on average, lower own-source revenue effort; for Governors, positive effects are punctual and depend on the type of tie (e.g., direct partisan alignment), rather than being generalized; (iii) for tax expenditures, administrative continuity and measurement matter: reelection correlates with higher GT where reporting is consistent, and alignment effects appear only when there is a formal partisan tie to the Governor and reliable GT records; otherwise, they do not persist. The results are consistent with national evidence of electoral-year retrenchment in transaction-based taxes and resilience of less discretionary bases such as COSIP. The observed association between presidential alignment and reduced own-source effort aligns with accommodation via discretionary transfers. Given the scarcity of municipal GT studies, these findings help fill an empirical gap and indicate that institutional design and data quality condition the direction and magnitude of effects. The main message is that cycles operate through the composition of revenue rather than the aggregate level.