Corrupção: percepções empíricas e teóricas

Abstract

Corruption is a problem that plagues most countries in the world, especially those that are in the process of development, as is the case in Brazil. The search for understanding about the causes and effects of corruption has given rise to a whole field of economic study, but most of them restrict their analysis to the macroeconomic effects of corruption, often leaving aside the microeconomic aspect and incentives that economic agents have to divert their conduct to the path of corruption. In the present work, we seek to analyze the most recent data on the perception of corruption in Brazil. Subsequently, it seeks to understand corruption based on game theory. When analyzing two worlds, where in one of them the level of perception about corruption is so high that practically no asymmetries are observed within one electoral process, while in the other the low level of perception about corruption leads to a scenario where asymmetry of information arises within the same process, comparing both balances it is possible to have a notion of the effect of corruption.