A adoção do in dubio pro societate como fundamento da decisão de pronúncia: análise de constitucionalidade

Abstract

The present work seeks to explore the conflict between in dubio pro societate, when applied in the decision to pronounce, with the constitutional principles that guide the criminal process, with special emphasis on the presumption of innocence. Using, above all, the criminal proceduralist doctrine, the rite of the Jury Court is approached in a broad and historical context and, continuously, its guiding principles. When approaching the first phase of the Jury Court rite, the pronouncement decision is explored in detail, addressing its essential criteria, such as the existence of sufficient evidence of authorship and materiality of the crime. Finally, it is concluded that although Brazilian jurisprudence favors in dubio pro societate in the decision to pronounce, such an approach contradicts constitutional principles, such as in dubio pro reo and the presumption of innocence. It is therefore pointed out that the absence of a legal provision for in dubio pro societate makes its application unfeasible and, secondly, the explicit presence of the presumption of innocence in the Brazilian constitutional system points to its unconstitutionality.