Alocação administrativa de água: modelagem matemática do comportamento do usuário caroneiro e da agência auto-interessada em jogos estratégicos

Abstract

The use permit is a mechanism to allocate water among users. Issuing water permits to all users is a usual objective of water agencies and it is seen as good water management practice. Nevertheless, there are costs associated with the correct application of this mechanism, including compliance checking and enforcement, since water permits are a command and control mechanism. The absence of compliance and enforcement will encourage free-riders, or users that do not comply with the permit rules. Compliance and enforcement processes are expensive and the State must bear their costs. The system must be appropriately designed in order to avoid unnecessary expenses. This paper proposes a mathematical model to design the enforcement system using game theory to explore the relationship between the permit system and the enforcementeffort. It is based on the “Law & Economics School” and it aims to define the level of enforcement efficiency required in order to reduce the number of free-riders in the system to a minimum. The fines collected may be so significant that the agency may see it as an attractive way of increasing its budget. This paper analyzes this type of behavior and shows how harmful it can be.