Alocação de renda dos jogos do campeonato cearense de futebol: uma abordagem utilizando valor de Shapley e índice de poder Shapley-Shubik

Abstract

This research is an application of the Shapley Value and the Power Index Shapley- Shubik as studied in the context of the Cooperative Game Theory. Specifically, this paper studied the distribution of net income generated at the box office of the Federação Cearense de Futebol-FCF during the 2010 football championship. The data were collected from the website of FCF, as well as from the Contexto Esportivo blog, and from the ransparency portal of the Tribunal de Contas do Município- TCM. The Shapley value and the power index Shapley-Shubik were applied to rank the football clubs participants according to the net income gains achieved in this allocation. The results revealed that the Shapley value application is more equal because the minor participants clubs like Quixadá, Limoeiro e Boa Viagem, with negative receipts from games in the previous status, get now positive ones from those techniques. The results from Power Index Shapley-Shubik show that the bigger the football club the bigger the net receipt from games, except to Fortaleza Esporte Clube.