A Constituição e o estado de exceção econômico: o autoritarismo monetário operado pela estrutura de administração da dívida pública

Abstract

In this dissertation we evaluate if the institutional structure of public debt administration instrumentalizes a economic state of exception in order to ban the constitutional program promulgated in Brazil in 1988, being maintained and operated by what can be characterized as a monetary authoritarianism. We start from an inductive analysis, with bibliographic and data research, in which we identify in the fiscal policy rules a large restrictive nature for primary public expenditure, while all budget preparation and execution seem to be oriented towards the free execution of the monetary policy, disregarding the effects of this monetary performance as the main conditioning factors of public indebtedness. Thus, we can see that the resources scarcity for the implementation of the social programs of the Federal Constitution is related to the way the state's financial activity is structured, and not to a supposed determinism to be viewed uncritically when pointing to an inescapable inexistence. possibilities for the achievements made as a commitment by the Constituent Legislator. Given these circumstances, we identified the presence of a economic state of exception as a goverment paradigm, which deepens the distance between the Constitutional Text and reality, operated by monetary authoritarianism, which is characterized by the uncritical acceptance of restrictive fiscal policy rules and constraints on the scarcity of government public resources. Therefore, we conclude that the understanding of fiscal responsibility needs to be revised, so that we can discuss institutional solutions that conciliate restraint of public spending with persistent state conditions to act and do his constitutional duties.