Sobre a relação da lógica com a ontologia em Hegel. Notas para uma discussão da interpretação de Redding

Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the presuppositions of Redding‘s interpretation of the relation of logic to ontology in Hegel. Specifically, I will challenge the following points: (i) the way Redding reconstructs the continuities and discontinuity between Aristotle, Kant and Hegel; (ii) the interpretation of Hegel‘s dialectic in terms of a pragmatics of linguistic use; (iii) the explanation of the objectivity of thinking by way of the notions of intentionality, realism and fallibilism; (iv) the criterion for the distinction between Objective and Subjective Logic in Hegel‘s Science of Logic. My claim is that ontology (theory of being) can only be justified for Hegel in the form of logic as the science of being as being that is thought. However, the dialectical and speculative character of Hegel‘s Logic does not admit any transcendental or quasi-transcendental approach, because the latter falls prey to radical skeptical objections. Differently from Kant‘s transcendental logic, Hegel‘s dialectical logic lays claim to incorporate this kind of objections into the path of the self-critical presentation of categories.