O experimento de pensamento do quarto chinês: a crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial forte

Abstract

Will one day developed digital computers be able to think in a similar way we human beings do? Or, being independent of technology, will they always be limited to manipulate data without comprehend them? In this work, I will present two opposite conceptions of Philosophy of Mind: the Strong Artificial Intelligence, which responds positively to the first question, as well as John Searle’s critique to this line, which responds positively to the second question. Therefore I will begin the article presenting the famous imitation game proposed by Alan Turing (1950) in order to decide if a machine is intelligent or not. This game is known by Turing’s test. Then I will exhaustively analyze the mental experiment of the chinese room, proposed by John Searle in 1980, which is a strong critique to the Turing’s Test and to the research program of the Strong Artificial Intelligence.