Determinantes do Cometimento de Ilicitudes na Gestão Municipal: O Caso do Ceará

Abstract

Most of the state and federal resources transferred to the municipalities are controlled by municipalities, therefore, the mayor, as the main manager of these resources, has a high discretion in its allocation. In view of this prerogative, the Mayor, in certain cases, evidence of deviations in transfers without the consent or participation thereof will be non-existent. In order to analyze possible acts of illegalities in the prefectures of Ceará in the years 2009 to 2016, a basic econometric model of discrete choice is proposed, from which the following conclusions were drawn: 1) re-elected mayors are more likely not to have disapproved accounts; 2) audited municipalities are more likely to have disapproved accounts; 3) the variable education (supply) presented a negative signal indicating that the greater the probability of non-compliance with the RFL; 4) the variable health (supply) presented negative sign indicating that the chance of committing illicit acts decreases whenever more health is offered.