Direitos absolutos em um mundo relativo? uma reflexão jurídico-filosófica sobre a universalidade dos direitos humanos

Abstract

Based on millenary principles and with initial formalization in the great declarations, Human Rights have become essential pieces for the international protection of the individual and of the collectivity and for limitation of power, along with the Fundamental Rights, constitutionally positive. The principle of the Dignity of the Human Person, which is primordial in any constitution today, was studied by Kant, but has its roots as far as Antiquity and was highlighted with the freedom of man by Pico della Miràndola. From the international acceptance of dignity, Human Rights are consolidated, of which the principle is a source value. Dignity also inspires the recognition of an irreducible ethical minimum, a core group of basic rights whose protection is imperative to anyone. Human Rights emerge as a modern, international and positive version of the Rights of Man, which came from Jusnaturalism. However, this heritage of Natural Law remains latent in the current declarations of rights, persisting for many as a foundation for the minimum guarantee of dignity. However, when postmodernity arises, rejecting the ideals of the Enlightenment creation of an order, it prefers the celebration of chaos that arises from the moral and philosophical acceptance of relativism. Multiculturalism is a central value of contemporary humanity, but it must be weighed against concepts such as truth and universality of rights, otherwise it will give rise to arbitrarily justified violations culturally. On the other hand, extreme universalism can also open up to totalitarianism if it uses the idea of superiority or imperativity to ignore the peculiarities of peoples and social groups at disproportionate levels. Seeking the middle way, without radicalism, the expression of dialogical universalism, sometimes in the formo f na overlappping consensus among the peoples, is considered one of the possible answers for the democratic reach of rights, remaining possible to harmonize it with cosmotheological and jusnaturalist perspectives. But it is pondered that intercultural dialogue has limitations, since it is only possible between those who accept and fulfill the presuppositions of dialogue itself. The path of individual morality and charity seems to be one of the few alternatives left for a world that propagates absolute rights, but sees itself more relative than ever.