A contratação nula no âmbito da administração pública e a análise de produção de efeitos previdenciários

Abstract

This study aims to demonstrate and analyze the production of welfare effects in case of zero hiring in Public Administration. Initially, we make a brief presentation on the guiding principles of administrative activity, explaining them and differentiating them expressed in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and recognized, seeking a parallel between them and the institute of the public tender. Then, one passes by the historical analysis of Brazilian Constitutions to the advent of the current, with changes made by the EC No. 19/98, which promoted the administrative reform. It made a historical evolution of the mandatory public tender over the Constitutions of Brazil, culminating in a rule arranged in art. 37, item II of CRFB/88. Finally, define the null hypothesis of hiring by political entities, revealing the statement of legal precedent No. 363 of the TST, which exposes the production of effects that hiring produces. Thus faces, we present arguments in favor of social rights guarantee thesis, including the production of welfare effects, even if it comes to hiring null, and shows up, conversely, consolidated understanding that Precedent spread in national courts, revealing, in this sense, the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in place of general repercussion, on production rights only to wages and the values of deposits of FGTS, regarding the null contract.