Certames Licitatórios e o valor das obras da administração pública no estado do Ceará em 2013

Abstract

This study examines the determinants of the outcome of bids for procurement of public works in the State of Ceará, once submitted to dispute with the presumption of equality among those interested in contracting with the Administration. Econometric models were developed to analyze if the amount of participants, the amount and bidding modality or type of department government can influence the final value and the corresponding discount on each event. The sample was extracted from transparency tools considering data from 2013, a period in which the Executive Power of State of Ceará bid more than R$ 5.6 billions in construction or engineering services. Robust estimates allow us to infer that the discount obtained through a bidding is directly affected by the number of participants and inversely by the value of the intended object, regardless of the modality and the kind of secretary of government. Together these results suggest that the bidding process practiced in every department of the State of Ceará is homogeneous, does not depend on the modality and the strategy to be considered by public managers in the State is reducing the bargaining power of the participants.