Princípios como induções deônticas: a previsão indutiva, o défice informativo e a derrotabilidade condicional nos princípios jurídicos

Abstract

The legal principles were innovations that come from recent debates inthe theory of law. Although they have been greeted with euphoria, becoming a sort of legal colloquialism, a widespread confusion concerning its logical structure and methodology of performance is perceptible. This explanation requires the comparison between rule norms, with strict conditions for application, containing "peremptory reasons for action," and principle norms, conceived from the theories of Dworkin and Alexy. It is emphasized the high generality and high concentration of structural information contained in the principle norm, the prima facie validity of its provisions, since they convey "reasons for balancing," in which the normative guideline will result between otherwise balancing, resulting on a proposition structured as a rule, Its expansive vocation for accommodating a set of a priori indeterminate behaviors; its regulation in "informative deficit" of the regulatory authority, in which is assigned a matter without delineating to the legislator all situations which the adjustment applies. Finally, it addresses how is the conflict between the principles and how to solve it, since the collision is a logical consequence of their generality and their informative deficit, where the same situation actually attracts the incidence of different joint principles.