Método e estrutura da dedução transcendental das categorias da segunda edição da Crítica da razão pura

Abstract

The present work aims to discuss the method and the structure of the transcendental deduction of the categories of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. With this purpose we divided the work into three parts. In the first, we analyze the legal background of Deduction. In our investigation of the sources of the Deduktion concept, we found that Deduction follows a legal model of argumentation. This model, as evidenced by the literature, is composed of two parts: one directed to the factual questions (quid facti, Faktum) and the other directed to the questions of law (quid juris). The correspondents to these two parts in the Critique are the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction, respectively. In the second part we deal with the problem of the structure of the transcendental Deduction of the second edition of the Critique. After analyzing some proposals, and considering the reasons in favor of them, we chose to follow the proof model in two steps that presented itself as the most plausible. According to this model, Deduction B consists of a single test consisting of two distinct steps, in which the first step is found in paragraphs from §15 to §20 and the second from §21 to §26. This model was what we followed in the third part, in which we commented on the two halves of the race. The main problem faced was to show how the second step of the test would not consist of a mere trivial inference from the first. The solution found by us was to show that the second step, insofar as it takes into account the subjective universality of sensitivity, is necessary to demarcate the limits of the cognitive use of the categories.