Perpectivismo em Nietzsche: a vida como critério de verdade

Abstract

The Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, by the abrangency of its conclusions, as well by the constancy of his approach, deserves special mention among the common themes in the interpretation of Nietzsche. As big as the importance of the topic, just the difficulty of their interpretation perhaps. To interpretate the perspectivism on Nietzsche, means to enter into a maze of possibilities created by the lack of systematicity of their development, as well as the interpretative plurality it provoked among his commentators. Although the perspectivism, coming to its ultimate consequences, implies a reassessment of the true as a value, we saw ourself in the need to assign to her a truth value, failing to invalidate both the results of its adoption, as the validity of any nietzschean conceptual scheme. Thus, to investigate the possible claim to truth that a thesis as the nietzschean epistemological perspectivism can sustain, means put ourself stand against a whole tradition that sustains itself in foundational and realistic precepts, and defend a conception of truth which can not be found, and which can not turn to reality as its validate criterion. So, deep into the problem, and often against, and only a few occasions to favor, a whole tradition of commentators, we can not say we have the final solution. So, rather than offering an peaceful interpretation of nietzschean perspectivism, we focus on it as on a puzzle whose greatness lies not in its deciphering, but in her insolubility.