A assimetria da informação em planos de saúde coletivos

Abstract

The work aims to show the influence of asymmetric information in corporate health plans. In the collective plans for membership and collective enterprise that allows non-compliance to the recipients of lack of health plan that come up to thirty days after the start of the contract. In these contracts mutualism is a way to reduce the costs expended by the recipients of a high degree of risk, likely to act asymmetrically with respect to the information provided. The aim was to show the impact of the presence of asymmetric information in health insurance companies in the first two months of the date of the contract, noting the high frequency of visits, tests and hospitalizations, and hence the corresponding values that influence the establishment of an imbalance financial. Through the use of frequency of consultations, tests and hospitalizations, the data collected from a given OPS was detected the possible presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in group plans analyzed. One way to contain such behavior is the failure to adopt mechanisms of demand inhibitors, such as co-participation.