Um estudo da "intencionalidade sem conteúdo" proposta pelo enativismo radical e sua relação com a inteligência artificial

Abstract

The problem of building a genuine artificial intelligence stays open. The paradigm that defined the first attempts was based in two philosophical assumptions: the representationalism, which claims that cognition happens through an internal replica of the world in the mind of the observer; and the computational theory of mind, which affirms that thinking is a computation of those symbolic representations inside the brain of the observer. These assumptions have been criticized, and one of the most recent alternatives, the radical enactivism, proposes that cognition involving content comes to life with human cultural practices, and that cognition in basic minds does not involve content. Therefore, at this level, "intentionality without content"must exist. The goals of this academic work are: briefly presenting the historical and philosophical roots of artificial intelligence, as well as the attempts of escaping from more traditional paradigms; discussing the philosophical terms intentionality and content; and presenting a study of "intentionality without content"proposed by the radical enactivism.