A posição original em John Rawls como base para uma sociedade democrática justa

Abstract

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has reoriented western philosophic thought, starting a new period of reflection on justice. Designed so as to offer ‘one’ theory, this work does not present a dogmatic purpose; however, it does propose principles of justice, resulting from a hypothetical original agreement, to constitute what it calls ‘justice as fairness’, characterized by the foundation of the rules of ‘fair’ in the institutions. Through the ‘veil of ignorance’ imposed to men in their ‘original position’, Rawls makes the design of such principles the result of a rational common sense among individuals, trying to achieve a moral ideal that works as an alternative for the utilitarian doctrine and as the basis for a fair democratic society. The paper aims demonstrate that the vehement disagreement used by Rawls’s critics when attacking the argument of original position decreases the importance of his theory.