O que motiva o default das famílias?: modelagem da inadimplência dos estados brasileiros

Abstract

Since the Basel agreement there is an intensity I in risk monitoring credit risk, mainly in default, that financial crises do not occur because the costs entailed going beyond the failing banks, generating high losses of products and employment, which in whole generate high costs to society. However, this work contributes to the analysis of credit risk because the default investigates Brazilian states and the Federal District by estimating model for default, which uses annual data between 2004 and 2012, where the macroeconomic variables were collected through IPEA and the variable studied by the Central Bank thus extracted 243 observations for each factor. The response of the model resulted in a positive relationship between the endogenous variable and the variables: the Gini index, per capita income, amount of credit offered and the unemployment rate. The prior relationship with the default coefficient of income distribution demonstrates a means to control this rate by the government. Income showed negatively related, so a higher income should generate low default, but this link must be given to the level of savings income provides such connection was suggested for future studies. The volume of credit and unemployment show was positively related to the dependent variable. The work adds to the literature, strengthening the relationship because of default with variables already used and adds infrequently seen relationships between macroeconomic variables and the breakdown or delay financial arrangements.