Limites constitucionais à atuação parlamentar em âmbito estadual

Abstract

The asymmetrical drawings of constitutional federalism directly limit the autonomy of the States in Brazil, making it necessary to place limits reflected on the State Legislature and, finally, on the parliamentary action statewide. The work carried out the historical relationship between the Brazilian and American federalism, distinguishing processes which developed the system of division of powers. From the cooperative federalism, analyzed the advances and retreats of the form of state, bringing the challenges of Asymmetries in the Brazilian case to equalize the federal balance. The autonomy of the States, in apparent retraction, was approached by the challenges of the centralization of power in the new model of constitutional federalism. From the challenges to effect the legislative autonomy of the States, reached impasses to the performance of the State Legislature. In this space, entering the parliamentary action in the context of concurrent jurisdiction, the work addressed material and formal limits that the 1988 Constitution provides, directly and indirectly, to the performance of parliamentarians. By reserving a private initiative of the executive branch and the legislative coordination Union on matters of Article 24, addressed the difficulties of conceptualization of competing standards, considering the centralization of vertical (federal and states) and horizontal (Legislative and Executive) power, based on the weighting between the assumptions of federal supremacy and the principle of predominance of interest. Finally, it analyzes the subjective aspects to resolve conflicts between competing powers, from the reflection of current jurisprudential majority, projecting the trend by relativization of political centralism, suggested by the principle of subsidiarity, which provides the appropriate mechanisms to the evolution of Brazilian federalism in the democratic system.