É possível a escolha social? Um estudo sobre o paradoxo de Arrow e a eleição de preferências em regimes democráticos

Abstract

The passage from individual to social choice is a complex topic that does not present a clear and peaceful solution. This article seeks to assess the possibility and the conditions for a social choice that is not only rooted in the individual criteria of economic rationality. Can we consider our representation systems based on polling and market rules, as genuine social choices? A social selection can be reduced to simple sum of individual choices that are at stake? To answer questions like these, we will begin from the work “Social choice and Individual Values”, by the economist Kenneth Arrow, in which the author starts from a formal explanation to get to his general theorem of possibility. It is intended to prove that the theorem, in fact, is a critique of economistic model (based on individual rationality) to predict social behavior, and, in addition, an exhibition of the inadequacy of a purely mathematical way of doing economics.