Influência do Conselho de Administração na relação entre as conexões políticas e a manipulação de resultados

Abstract

In this study, when analyzing the political connections based on the Agency Theory, it is suggested that such connections are positively related to earnings manipulation practices, measured from the management based on accruals and the management of operational activities. As a way of mitigating the opportunistic practices that may be derived from political connections, it is expected that the association between political connections and match-fixing practices will be weaker due to certain characteristics of the board of directors, such as size, expertise, female participation and independence of the body, in addition to the dual role of the CEO. Thus, the study aims to evaluate the influence of the board of directors on the relationship between political connections and the manipulation of results of companies belonging to the S&P 500 index. Using a documental procedure, with the application of descriptive statistics tools, test of differences in means and multiple linear regression analysis for data treatment (1,554 observations), involving the period from 2015 to 2020 of 259 companies belonging to the S&P 500 index, there was a positive and significant influence of corporate lobbying on the management of earnings by accruals and, in addition to corporate lobbying positively affecting earnings management by operating activities, this is also positively impacted by the political background of the board of directors. In turn, when inserting the characteristics of the board of directors in the regression, the findings indicate that some control mechanisms inherent to the body, individual or interacting with the political connection metrics, tend to reduce the manipulation of results. The results indicate that the positive association between political connections and earnings management by accruals is weaker for companies depending on the characteristics of the board of directors related to size and female participation in the board, as well as the interaction of board independence with the Lobbying. In turn, it was found that female participation in the Board of Directors, when analyzed individually, has an effect on the relationship between political connections and earnings management by operational activities, as well as the interaction of Board size with Corporate Lobbying. The analyzes of the variables and relationships in this study must be carried out with caution, bearing in mind that the results varied when the models were run based on the sector in which they operate and the level of earnings management, considering the quartiles. From a theoretical perspective, the research findings confirm the predictions of Agency Theory, in addition to contributing to the literature, companies and investors.