Esquemas imagético-cinestésicos e linguagem: considerações filosóficas sobre o realismo corporificado

Abstract

The Cartesian philosophical tradition, for many years, has investigated the mind dissociated from the body, in search of objective knowledge. The purpose of this article is to give a brief presentation of philosophical aspects that directly contributed to the better understanding of the relation of the mental structure with the body. The embodied realism (LAKOFF, 1987; JOHNSON, 1987; LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999) states that concepts and mental structures justify their existence due to basic experiences with the body in the world, allowing knowledge about reality to be the result of sensory-motor actions in it. After exploring some of the schemes suggested by Johnson (1987), we understand that the imaging schemes present themselves as structures of a simple nature (representing the most diverse basic bodily experiences), general (by generalizing similar embodied experiences), and conceptual because they are found in human cognition and can be used during discourse interaction). Thus we are in favor of this embodied view of mind.