Os limites da coletividade a partir das teorias dos grupos sociais de Mancur Olson e do conceito da vontade geral de J. -J. Rousseau

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the limits of collectivity from Mancur Olson's theory of social groups and from J.-J. Rousseau's concept of the general will. To this end, we will rescue the concept of general will proposed by Rousseau's works, in particular, the Social Contract (1973) and the Treaty on Political Economy (2003), as well as the synthetic presentation of the theory of social groups from American economist Mancur Olson exposed in the book entitled The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (2015). Taking as a methodological resource the comparative documentary research, it is intended here to investigate to what extent Olson'sthesis is anticipated in Rousseau's thought regarding the philosopher's suspicion of Geneva about the action of factions within the State and the special conditions that, from the meeting of all citizens, derives the general will. Thus, we divide the text into three parts. In the first part, we will present Olson's thesis about the logic of the action of the collectivities. Next, we will try to demonstrate how Rousseau elaborates the concept of general will and the special conditions in whichit expresses itself. Finally, we intend to demonstrate the approximations and distances between Rousseau's thought and Mancur Olson's theses about the limits of collective action.