A forma lógica de sentenças de existência: uma avaliação da abordagem quantificacional

Abstract

The objective of this work is to present an evaluation of the quantificational approach of the problem of existence in the versions defended by Frege, Russell and Quine. This approach is presented having as a background its reaction to the classic model of sentence analysis used by inflationed ontologies derived from Plato’s nonbeing argument, as well as from the Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The basic idea is to show that the inflationed ontology claimed by Plato and Meinong - which, in the most part, is derived from a deficient model of sentence analysis -, can be eliminated through an efficient logical treatment of existence utterances based on the logic of predicates. In spite of internal divergences, the central thesis of proponents of the quantificational approach is that the existence predicate is, from a logical point of view, represented by the existential quantifier (E) of the logic of predicates. I also try to show that, although the quantificational approach represents an advance without precedents in the philosophy concerning to the logical status analysis of the term “exist”, it has some relevant limitations which its proponents have not overcome yet.